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Taxation of Domestic Dividend Income and Foreign Investment Holdings 
 
1.Introduction 
The effect of taxation on cross-border capital holdings has been considered by a 
number of authors. Much of the focus of this literature has been on the effect of taxes on 
foreign investment or on income from foreign investment. In Black (1974) taxes are 
proportional to the net holdings of foreign assets and all risky assets are traded, whereas in 
Stulz (1981) investors pay a tax proportional to the absolute holdings of risky foreign assets 
and not all risky assets are traded
1
. Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) derive efficient portfolios in 
a world where there are barriers to cross border investment. Errunza and Losq (1989) find the 
effect of partial integration of markets on the multilateral structure of security returns and 
holdings within a multi-country model. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1995) examine pre-tax return on stocks and conclude 
that capital gains taxes on foreign owners act as a barrier to portfolio investment. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) find that the residual tax on US multinational firms’ foreign earnings 
skews the composition of outbound capital flows
2
. Huizinga and Nielson (1997) show that 
with an increase in foreign ownership of firms a higher tax rate on source based investment 
income may be called for. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption 
of foreign income tax. Davies et al (2009) use affiliate-level data from Swedish 
multinationals to examine the impact of tax treaties on both overall affiliate sales and the 
                                                          
1
 Analysis of the effect of taxes on international portfolio flows is related to work on optimal taxation. Devereux 
(2008) states that the same rate of tax on investment income without regard to the source of that income ensures 
equality of pre-tax returns to capital across countries (maintaining production efficiency across countries). In 
empirical work Errunza and Losq (1985) find that over the period 1976-1980 markets are mildly segmented in 
that large risk premiums are found to exist for subsets of securities. 
2
 Chan et al. (2005) employ a country specific time invariant tax variable capturing withholding tax from 
dividends effect on mutual fund equity allocations and find a statistically significant effect on home bias. Aviat 
and Coeurdacier (2007) examine the effect of dividend tax and interest rates on bilateral banking claims. They 
state that the tax rates are far from negligible, ranging from 0% to 40%. 
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composition of those sales and find that a tax treaty increases the probability of investment by 
a firm in a given country.  
The primary goal in this paper is to investigate the influence of the taxation of 
domestic dividend income on the foreign investment holdings of domestic investors. It is 
conjectured that the heavier is domestic taxation of domestic dividend income, the more 
attractive is foreign investment to domestic agents. In this paper we recognize that in 
assessing the level of domestic taxation of domestic dividend income it is crucial to realise 
that some countries operate a dividend imputation system
3
. Under a complete dividend 
imputation tax system the double taxation of domestic dividend income is eliminated. 
Domestic investors paid dividends under a dividend imputation system receive a credit for 
tax paid at the company level and this reduces the overall effective tax rate on domestic 
investment.  
It is important to factor in the influence of a dividend imputation system on returns to 
domestic investors since a higher level of dividend imputation makes investment in domestic 
securities more attractive and thus makes investment in foreign securities less attractive. In 
our sample of mature economies that have resident investors with foreign income, 52% of the 
observations are provided imputation of taxes paid on dividend income by domestic 
corporations. Imputation eliminates the double taxation of income and dividends. 
Accordingly shareholders receive a higher income stream under dividend imputation tax 
                                                          
3 Dividend imputation has been discussed in the literature. Cannavan et al. (2004) examine Australia’s dividend 
imputation system and emphasize that in a small open economy a firm’s cost of capital is not affected by such a 
system since the marginal stockholder is a foreign investor who receives no benefit from the imputation of tax 
credits. Feuerherdt et al (2010) estimate a value for the franking credits that attach to hybrid securities by 
examining stock price changes around ex-dividend date. They find that cum-dividend day prices on hybrid 
securities do not include any value for franking credits. 
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system. These factors have the potential to significantly influence the extent of foreign 
investment in equity flows. 
The effective tax rate on domestic investment will be constructed to reflect the 
influence of dividend imputation and corporate and personal income tax rates. It is found that 
a fall of 10% in effective tax rate on domestic dividend income reduces foreign equity 
investment by about 5.22%. Tax levied by foreign governments on foreign dividend income 
is also considered. Cross border taxation in foreign country induces a bias towards source 
country holding domestic financial assets because it puts additional cost on holding foreign 
securities from a source country investors’ perspective. In mitigation, with regard to dividend 
withholding tax on payments to foreign shareholders, French and Poterba (1991) note that 
typically these payments can be credited against taxes in the investors' home country. 
Taxation of dividend income accruing to foreign investors varies by country and by foreign 
investor. Cross-border equity investment is found to be increased if tax credit rises for taxes 
paid overseas.  
Empirical analysis is based on bilateral investments among 23 mature economies over 
2001-2011. Results are robust to consideration of the global financial crisis and the role of 
double taxation treaties. The presence of a double taxation treaty has a significant positive 
effect on cross-border equity holdings. To deal with endogeneity between the equity, tax and 
other variables the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data method is used 
to estimate the model. 
The taxation of domestic and foreign dividend income is discussed in section 2. The 
data and the variables are discussed in section 3. The econometric model is presented in 
Section 4. The empirical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Taxation of Domestic and Foreign Dividend Income 
In this study the influence of the effective tax rate for domestic investment and the 
influence of taxation of foreign dividends on equity investment will be examined. We will 
define the effective rate of tax on domestic investment taking account of dividend imputation, 
and discuss international taxation of dividend income.  
2.1. Taxation of domestic investment 
A potentially important consideration in the effects of international taxation on 
foreign equity investment is whether a country has a dividend imputation system in place. 
Dividend imputation might bias domestic investors against foreign investment (Booth, 1987). 
Domestic investors paid dividends under a dividend imputation system receive a credit for 
the tax paid at the company level. Empirical analysis will be based on bilateral investments 
among 23 mature economies over 2001-2011. Table 1 presents information on taxation in 23 
developed countries for the year 2011. In column (1) data are provided on the dividend 
imputation rate, the amount of the corporate income tax imputed to shareholders as a tax 
offset.  
During each year over 2001-2004 eight, in 2005 six, in 2006 five, and each year over 
2007-2011 four of the twenty three countries in our sample have dividend imputation systems 
in place. Finland and France (UK) have full (partial) dividend imputation over 2001-2011. 
Finland and France changed from full dividend imputation over 2001-2004 to a partial 
inclusion system in 2005, and Canada switched from partial to full dividend imputation in 
2009. Norway has partial (full) dividend imputation in 2001 (2002-2005). Spain has partial 
dividend imputation over 2001-2006 and France has full dividend imputation over 2001-
2004. Australia and New Zealand have full imputation and UK has partial imputation in place 
during 2001-2011. Most of the other countries in Table 1 have either a classical tax system 
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under which company profit is taxed at corporate level and again upon distribution as 
dividends at shareholder level, or a modified classical system under which dividend income is 
taxed at preferential rates (for instance, compared to interest income) at the shareholder level. 
A full (partial) imputation tax system provides full (partial) dividend tax credit at shareholder 
level for the underlying corporate profits tax. Thus, for example, Australia provides full 
imputation since 100% of the corporate income tax of 30% is imputed to shareholders as 
reflected in a 30% imputation rate. New Zealand provides full imputation since 100% of the 
corporate income tax of 28% is imputed to shareholders as reflected in a 28% imputation 
rate.
4
 
In columns (2) through (4) of Table 1 data appears on corporate, top marginal rate for 
personal income tax on grossed-up dividends and the effective marginal tax rate on pre-tax 
distributed profit. The effective marginal tax rate is influenced by the corporate and personal 
income tax rates and by whether a dividend imputation system is in place. These connections 
will be discussed in the next subsection. These data show considerable variation across 
countries during 2011.  
To illustrate the role of dividend imputation in influencing equity flows let’s consider 
the following. The franking ratio
if  is defined as the actual fraction of corporate tax imputed 
as tax shield to shareholders. Define ic  to be the corporate income tax rate in country i . For 
one of dollar of dividend income the underlying corporate income is 1/ (1 )ic  and the 
corporate income tax paid is / (1 )i ic c   . With a non-zero franking ratio, one dollar of 
dividend income generates a tax offset of / (1 )i i ic cf     against taxes on dividend income 
                                                          
4
 Cannavan et al. (2004) note that under Australia’s dividend imputation system a foreign investor does not  
receive a benefit from the imputation of tax credits. 
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owed by the shareholder. This tax offset appears as part of the shareholder’s taxable income. 
The shareholder’s taxable income per one dollar of dividend income is given by 
1 / (1 )i i i ic cY f            (1) 
Define 
i
p  to be the personal income tax rate on dividends in country i . With a non-
zero franking rate, income tax paid by the shareholder will be the income tax liability minus 
the tax credit from the franked dividends and is equal to  
{1 / (1 )} / (1 ) 0i i i i i i i i i ip c c c c pTax f f for f           .   (2) 
Thus, an increase in the franking rate reduces the tax paid on domestic investment and makes 
a domestic investment more attractive relative to a foreign investment. In the absence of a 
dividend imputation system, one dollar of dividend income yields (1 )
i
p   dollars of after tax 
income.  
The income tax paid per dollar of pre-tax profit is given by 
(1 ) (1 )
/ (1 )
i
i i i i i i
p c c pi i
c c
Tax
I f        
   
.             (3) 
The effective marginal tax rate on distributed profit will be given by 
(1 ) (1 )ii i i i i i i i ic c p c c pI f            .      (4) 
If 
if =0, classical double taxation of dividends applies and the effective tax rate  
ii i i i i
p c p c       . Under full imputation, 
if =1, and ii  = i i i i ip p c p c       . An increase in 
the franking ratio reduces the effective tax rate on distributed profit.  
In this paper we will introduce the variable ii  as an influence on international equity 
investment. It is important to factor in the influence of a dividend imputation system on 
returns to domestic investors since an increase in dividend imputation makes investment in 
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domestic securities more attractive and thus makes investment in foreign securities less 
attractive.  
2.2. Taxation of foreign investment 
The withholding tax rates on dividends paid to foreigners vary between countries 
assessing the tax and across the country of residence of the investor. The withholding tax 
rates in 23 developed countries on dividends paid to foreigners are shown in Table 2. The 
withholding tax rates on dividends paid to foreigners in 2011 vary from 0% (on all foreign 
investors) in a number of countries including Hong Kong and the U.K., to rates that vary 
between 15% and 25% by France and Germany and 10% and 47% by Greece. It is also 
probable that bilateral tax treaties and regulatory associations might influence dividend tax 
rates and bilateral equity investments and trade flows. In Table 2, the withholding tax rate in 
country j  on dividends paid to residents of i , ijd , is shown in bold in the event that a 
bilateral double taxation treaty applies.
5
  
In a world with extensive double taxation treaties the variable tax burden on dividends 
paid to foreign investors is really a proxy variable for tax credit for foreign taxes paid. About 
88% of the observations on foreign investment in our sample are for countries with a bilateral 
double taxation treaty on dividend tax withheld.
6
 
A variable for the tax credit value for foreign dividend taxes paid will be given by: 
1
1 (1 )
j
ij ij ijt
t d tj
t
D
TaxCredit
M
 

 
           
i
c
ij
dif  
    (5) 
          
 ijtj
t
j
ti
c
M
D
 

1
1           
i
c
ij
dif  
 
 
                                                          
5
 In Table 2 for 2011, Hong Kong does not have a bilateral double taxation treaty with 11 countries and Greece 
does not have a bilateral double taxation treaty with 5 countries.  
6
 Even in those cases where there is no tax treaty, default domestic law applies and there could well be a tax 
credit for foreign dividend tax paid. Another issue arises concerning the extent to which dividend tax credits for 
dividend income for foreign investors is not adequate to recapture all the taxes paid. 
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where is jtM  is the equity market index for country j  (in local currency) at the end of time 
period t , 1/
j j
t tD M   is dividend yield for country j  (
j
tD  is always non-negative), and 
ij
t  is 
the appreciation of country 'i s  currency relative to country 'j s  currency between periods 
1t   and t . 
The assumption in equation (5) is that a tax credit is available tax treaty or not.
1ijtTaxCredit  does not capture the situation in which there might be no tax credit when there 
is no tax treaty with the country in which the dividend is initially taxed. An alternative 
measure of tax credit is given by: 
1
2 (1 )
j
ij j ijt
t d tj
t
D
TaxCredit
M
 

 
           
1 TDDandif ic
ij
d 
   
           
 ijtj
t
j
ti
c
M
D
 

1
1          
1 TDDandif ic
ij
d 
  (6)
 
           0         0if TDD     
In equation (6), the construction of 2ijtTaxCredit  assumes that if there is a double 
taxation treaty ( 1TDD  ) the maximum tax credit is available, and if there is not a double 
taxation treaty ( 0TDD  ) then the tax credit is zero. The actual tax credit available is likely 
to be bracketed between 1ijtTaxCredit  and 2
ij
tTaxCredit . The correlation of 1
ij
tTaxCredit  with 
2ijtTaxCredit  is 0.83.
7
 Note that if no dividends are paid, then 1ijtTaxCredit  and 2
ij
tTaxCredit  
equal zero even though ijd  is non-zero. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
                                                          
7
 In constructing the tax credit variable the corporate income tax has been used as the relevant domestic tax rate 
against which to compare the rate of tax on dividends levied by the foreign government. 
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The sources of data on the variables are provided in Table A.1. The cross-border 
portfolio equity data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS). The empirical analysis involves cross-border equity investment 
for 23 countries over the period 2001 to 2011. The countries are listed in Table 1. In the 
paper, the dependent variable, cross-border equity holdings is defined as the log of equity 
holdings of the source country in host country normalized by the financial wealth of source 
country. 
3.1. Tax Variables 
 The effective tax rate on the returns to domestic investment in the source country is 
used as a variable in the equation for foreign equity holdings. The effective tax rate on 
dividend income is defined in equation (4) and reflects the corporate, top personal income tax 
rate on dividend income and dividend imputation. Variables for tax credits for taxes on 
foreign dividend income are defined in equations (5) and (6).
8
 
3.2. Familiarity and Financial Sophistication Variables 
Familiarity and financial sophistication variables play an important role in investors’ 
equity investment decisions (see Huberman (2001), Portes et al. (2001), Sarkissian and Schill 
(2004), Portes and Rey (2005), Ferreira and Matos (2008)). Trade is log value of ratio of 
imports of source country to product of gross domestic products (GDPs) of source and host 
countries. Size is log value of financial wealth of host country. Foreign listing is share of host 
country’s stock market that is listed on source country’s stock exchanges (either directly or 
has issued public debt in the source country). Stocks traded is total value of shares traded 
during the period divided by GDP. Turnover ratio is total value of shares traded during the 
                                                          
8
 Tax rate variables have been employed in analyses of the effect of cross-border taxation on equity holdings. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) employ the top statutory corporate income tax rate as their primary tax variable. 
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), Chan et al. (2005) and Bekaert and Wang (2009) utilize the average percentage 
withholding tax on dividends paid to non-residents analyses of the effect of tax portfolio choice. 
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period divided by the average market capitalization during the period. Market capitalization 
is ratio of market capitalization of listed companies and GDP. This is a proxy for equity 
market development. More developed financial markets are generally more diversified and 
better integrated with world financial markets than smaller markets and hence likely to share 
information more intensively (as noted by Levine and Zervos (1998)). Double taxation treaty 
is dummy=1 if source and host country have a double taxation treaty in place otherwise 0. 
Global financial crisis is dummy=1 during and after global financial crisis (2007 to 2011) 
and dummy=0 before global financial crisis (2001 to 2006). 
3.3. Summary statistics and Correlations 
Summary statistics on the variables are provided in Table 3. The mean of effective tax 
on domestic investment in source country is around 44.90% with a range between 25.0% and 
66.9%. The tax rate levied on foreign dividends varies between 0 and 47% and has a mean 
value of around 13.3%. Table 4 provides a correlation matrix of the variables. The correlation 
between dividend tax credit1 and dividend tax credit2 is 0.889. These variables will not 
appear in the same regression. Effective tax rate in the source country has a positive 
correlation with equity flow of 0.176. Most of the correlations do not suggest a problem with 
inclusion of variables in the regression equations.  
4. The econometric models 
To deal with endogenity between the equity, tax and other variables employed in the 
regression analysis the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data method 
with be used to estimate the model. It is likely that countries well integrated financially are 
likely to better coordinate their fiscal policies and lower their bilateral taxation through tax 
treaties thus it is important to utilize an econometric method that deals directly with the issue 
of endogenous variables. 
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Estimation will be based on the dynamic panel models. These dynamic relationships 
include a lagged dependent variable among the regressors.  
itittiit uxyy   
'
1,  Ni ,,.........1   Tt .....,.........2   (7) 
where  is a scalar, '
itx  is a K1 vector of explanatory variables and   is a 1K  vector of 
parameters to be estimated. The error term itu  is composed of an unobserved effect and time-
invariant effect i  and random disturbance term it .  
 itiitu            (8) 
where  2,0~  IIDi  and  2,0~  IIDit  independent of each other and among 
themselves. The dynamic panel data regressions described in above equations (7) and (8) are 
characterized by two sources of persistence over time i.e. autocorrelation due to the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the 
heterogeneity among the individuals. Since ity  is a function of i , this implies that 1, tiy  is 
also a function of i . The OLS estimator for equation (7) is biased and inconsistent even if 
the it  are not serially correlated. The fixed effect estimator of (7), which eliminates the 
individual effects i , produces biased and inconsistent estimates (Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 
1995). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest first differencing the model to get rid of the i  
and then using  3,2,2,   tititi yyy  as an instrument for  2,1,1,   tititi yyy . This 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation method leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient 
estimates of the parameters in the model because it does not make use of all available 
moment conditions (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995) and it does not take into account the differenced 
structure on residual disturbances  it . Arellano Bond (1991) derived a one-step and two-
step GMM estimators using moment conditions in which lagged levels of the dependent and 
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predetermined variables were instruments for the differenced equations
9
. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show that the lagged-level instruments in the Arellano-Bond estimator become weak 
as the autoregressive process becomes too persistent or the ratio of the variance of the panel-
level effect to the variance of the idiosyncratic error becomes too large. Linear dynamic panel 
data models include p lags of the dependent variable on covariates and contain unobserved 
panel level effects, fixed or random. Arellano and Bover (1995) develop a framework for 
efficient instrumental variable estimators of random effects models with information in levels 
which can accommodate predetermined variables. Building on the work of Arellano and 
Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed a system estimator that uses moment 
conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation in 
addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced 
equation. This estimator is designed for datasets with many panels and few periods. The 
method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and requires the 
initial condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with the first difference of the 
first observation of the dependent variable. This paper employs Arellano-Bover/Blundell 
Bond estimation technique with lags(1) and AR(2) tests. 
In equation (7) ity is the equity investment from source country to host country 
normalized by financial wealth of source country. itx  is the set of explanatory variables, and 
includes tax variables (dividend tax credit, effective tax, corporate tax, personal income tax), 
trade, size, foreign listing, stocks traded, turnover ratio, and market capitalization
10
. 
5. Results 
                                                          
9
 See Arellano and Bond (1991), Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Holtz et al (1988) for earlier works on GMM. 
10
 Appendix Table A1 gives definition and data sources of variables.  
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Results from estimating versions of equation (7) by Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
linear dynamic panel-data method with lags(1) and AR(2) tests are reported for 2001-2011 in 
Tables 5 and 6. Cross-border equity holding is the dependent variable. In the regressions in 
Tables 5 and 6 tax variables, familiarity and financial sophistication variables appear in 
different combinations in order to examine the robustness of results. The Wald chi2 statistics 
is significant indicating that the parameters associated with these variables are not zero and 
inclusion of these variables in the regressions is appropriate. The Arellano-Bond test for 
serial correlation in the first differenced errors reported in the Tables indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation of second order.
11
 
5.1. Effective tax rate 
The effective tax on domestic investment in the source country ( ii , defined in 
equation (4)) appears in all regressions in Table 5. The effective tax rate (for domestic 
investment) in the source country has a positive and statistically significant effect on cross-
border equity holdings in all regressions in Table 5. This result is robust to inclusion of 
alternative measures of dividend tax credit and to inclusion of a variety of familiarity and 
financial sophistication variables. Based on the coefficients in Table 5 (columns (1) to (4)), a 
rise of 10% in the effective tax rate in the source country will increase cross-border equity 
investment by 5.38%.
12
  
                                                          
11
 The moment conditions employed by the Arellano Bover/Blundell method are valid only if there is no serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic error. The Arellano Bond test is a test for no autocorrelation in linear dynamic 
panel models. The Arellano-Bond test examines for serial correlation in the first differenced errors. Because the 
first difference of independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic errors will be auto-correlated, rejecting 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at order one in the first differenced errors does not imply that the 
model is mis- specified. Rejecting the null hypothesis at higher orders implies that the moment conditions are 
not valid. After the one step estimator, the test can be computed only when robust standard error has been 
specified. The robust standard error uses the robust or sandwich estimator of variance. This estimator is robust 
to some types of misspecification so long as the observations are independent. In our regressions results, there is 
no autocorrelation of second order. 
12
 The mean value of effective tax rate in source country is 44.904 and average coefficient of effective tax rate is 
0.021 in columns (1) to (4) of Table 5. In columns (1) to (4) a rise in effective tax rate in source country by 10% 
increases equity flow by 5.388% (=4.4904 x 0.012).  
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5.2. Dividend tax credit 
The dividend tax credit for foreign dividend taxes paid per unit of currency invested, 
defined as 1ijtTaxCredit in columns (1)-(4) and as 2
ij
tTaxCredit in columns (5)-(8), is positive 
and statistically significant in all regressions in Table 5. The average coefficient of dividend 
tax credit is 0.302 for 1ijtTaxCredit  
and 0.296 for 2ijtTaxCredit . The average value of the 
coefficient of dividend tax credit implies that a 10 percent increase in the dividend tax credit 
will increase cross-border equity investment on average by approximately 1.07 percent. 
In columns (9)-(12) of Table 5, the withholding tax rate in country j  on dividends 
paid to residents of i , ijd , replaces 1
ij
tTaxCredit  and 2
ij
tTaxCredit  as explanatory variable in 
the regressions. The withholding tax rate in country j  on dividends paid to residents of i  has 
a negative sign but is not statistically significant. The estimate of the effect of effective tax on 
domestic investment in the source country ( ii ) remains positive and statistically significant 
effect at the 1% in these regressions. 
5.3. Familiarity and Financial Sophistication   
The foreign listing variable is positive and significant at 1 percent in all regressions in 
Table 5. The reduction in information costs associated with foreign country’s firms 
conforming to the source country’s regulatory environment is an important determinant of the 
source country’s equity holdings in foreign country. The result is in accordance with Ahearne 
et al. (2004). The financial wealth of host country (size) is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions in Table 5 as expected. In all regressions in Table 5 the trade 
variable is positive and statistically significant implying that source country’s investors’ are 
better informed about those foreign firms, with which source country has a stronger trade in 
goods (as documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), amongst others).  
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In Table 5, variables that proxy for a lower level of financial friction are included in 
turn in the regression equations to ensure the robustness of the results regarding the role of 
effective taxation. The first three of these variables capture the financial sophistication of the 
host market. An increase in total value of shares traded divided by GDP in the host country 
has a statistically significant effect on equity investment. Similarly, a rise turnover ratio (total 
value of shares traded divided by market capitalization) and market capitalization (ratio of 
market capitalization of listed companies to GDP) have statistically significant effects on 
equity investment.
13
  
5.4. Double taxation treaty and global financial crisis
14
 
The effective tax rate for domestic investment has a positive and statistically 
significant effect at the 1% level on cross-border equity holdings in columns 1-4 and 5-8 in 
Table 6 when double taxation treaty and global financial crisis (GFC) dummy variables are 
included in the regression. The presence of a double taxation treaty between source and host 
countries significantly enhances cross-border equity investment. A dummy variable to 
capture the GFC period (dummy=1 over 2007 to 2011 and zero otherwise) is statistically 
significant and that cross-border equity investment is significantly less over  2007 to 2011 
than over 2001 to 2006. 
As a further robustness test we consider the effect of recognizing regulatory 
associations between countries. Regulatory associations that have an effect on bilateral tax 
rates as well as influence equity investment and trade are the European Union (EU), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (ANZ). In results not reported, it is found that inclusion of dummy variables to 
                                                          
13
 Results are also robust to consideration of other measures the familiarity of domestic investors with the 
foreign market, such as if source and host country have a common language or have common legal origin. 
14
 During global financial crisis, cross border equity holdings fell quite significantly during 2008 and then 
recovered (only partly) in 2009. For example, US equity holdings abroad were 5,248.0 billion USD in 2007, 
2,748.4 billion USD in 2008, and 3.995.3 billion USD in 2009.  
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capture these associations between countries does not affect results. The statistical 
significance of the effective tax variable tax on domestic investors is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in all regressions estimated.
15
 
 
5.5. Relatively high tax rates 
An interesting question concerns the influence of relatively high taxation.
16
 Dividend 
tax credits in the cases of high taxation of dividend income for foreign investors are not 
adequate to recapture all the taxes paid. To account for this factor we introduce a high tax 
dummy variable defined as follows:  
    
1ijtHighTax 
        
ij i
d cif  
       (9) 
                   
0
       
ij i
d cif  
   
where ijd  is the tax rate in country j  on foreign dividend income of investors from country i  
and ic  is the corporate income tax rate in the investor’s home country. If the foreign tax rate 
is high relative to the domestic tax rate, dividend tax credit cannot offset all foreign taxes 
paid. For this we expect the high tax dummy variable defined in equation (9) to be negatively 
associated with cross-border equity.  
Results from the inclusion of ijtHighTax  in regression equations for cross-border 
equity are reported in columns 9 to 12 in Table 6. The coefficients of the high tax dummy 
variable are negative and statistically significant at 1 percent in all regression equations. 
Taxation of dividend income of foreign investors at relatively high rates reduces foreign 
                                                          
15
 The recognition of regulatory associations between countries can capture a number of issues not described by 
the other variables. For example, conditions for exempting dividends from withholding tax vary by being a 
subsidiary company to its parent company with EU member states. 
16
 Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that countries with high international double taxation are less likely to draw 
parent firms following an acquisition. 
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investment. The inclusion of the ijtHighTax  variable does affect the statistical significance of 
the effective tax on domestic dividend income variable. 
In summary, it is found that the effective tax rate (inclusive of dividend imputation) 
on domestic investors in the source country and the tax credit for foreign taxes paid on 
dividend income generated overseas has a statistically significant positive effect on bilateral 
equity holdings. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper it is argued that the heavier is domestic taxation of domestic dividend 
income, the more attractive is foreign investment to domestic agents. Under a dividend 
imputation system, domestic investors who are paid dividends receive a credit for tax for 
corporate taxes paid and this reduces the effective tax rate on domestic investment. The 
effective tax rate on domestic investment is constructed to reflect the influence of dividend 
imputation (and of corporate and personal income tax rates). To investigate the effect of tax 
on equity flows given the endogeneity of equity, tax and other variables, regressions are 
estimated by Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data method. 
It is found that a fall of 10% in effective tax rate on domestic dividend income 
reduces foreign equity investment by between 5.38%. Taxation of dividend income accruing 
to foreign investors varies by country and by foreign investor. Cross-border equity 
investment is increased if tax credit rises for taxes paid overseas.  
Empirical analysis is based on bilateral investments among 23 mature economies over 
2001-2011. To deal with endogenity between the equity, tax and other variables employed in 
the regression analysis the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data method 
with be used to estimate the model. The presence of a double taxation treaty has a significant 
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positive effect on equity holdings. Results are robust to consideration of the global financial 
crisis. 
Our results shed light on issues related to formulation of cross-border investment and 
tax policies. The results suggest that fiscal and investing policies ought not to be regarded as 
independent. The financial liberalization policies enhancing cross-border equity investment 
through tax credit should be considered simultaneously rather than on a standalone basis. The 
finding of significant effects of taxation on equity investment on a bilateral basis, suggests 
that the current debate in Europe on a future harmonization of fiscal rules that is restricted to 
bilateral conventions between countries might be better conducted on a broader basis.  Other 
things equal, results suggest that greater domestic investment by domestic investors is 
encouraged by lower taxation of domestic dividend income. 
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Appendix Table A.1: Data sources of variables 
Variables Description and data sources 
Equity Flows 
 
 
Dividend tax credit1 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividend tax credit2 
 
 
Effective tax source 
 
Equity flows is log value of ratio of equity investment from source country to host country and 
financial wealth of source country.  
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. Authors own calculations. 
Dividend tax credit1 is product of foreign dividend tax withheld rate and dividend yield if foreign 
dividend tax withheld rate is less than or equal to home country’s combined corporate income tax 
rate. It is product of home country’s combined corporate income tax rate and foreign dividend 
yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is greater than home country’s combined corporate 
income tax.  
Source: Price Waterhouse, 2001-2012 
Dividend tax credit2 = Dividend tax credit1 if there is a double taxation treaty between home and 
foreign country, and Dividend tax credit2 = 0 otherwise.  
Source: Price Waterhouse, 2001-2012 
Effective tax source is effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit in source 
country. 
Source: OECD tax database, 2001-2012. Authors own calculations. 
High tax High tax is dummy=1 if tax rate in host country on foreign dividend income from source country is 
greater than corporate income tax rate in investor’s home country, otherwise 0 
 Source: OECD tax database, 2001-2012. Price Waterhouse, 2001-2012. Authors own calculations. 
Trade Trade is log value of ratio of imports of source country to product of gross domestic products 
(GDPs) of source and host countries. 
Source: Import data is from Direction of Trade Statistics (2012). GDP data is from World 
Development Indicators (2012). Authors own calculations. 
Size 
 
Foreign listing 
Size is log value of financial wealth of host country. 
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. Authors own calculations. 
Foreign listing is share of host country’s stock market that is listed on source country’s stock 
exchanges (either directly or has issued public debt in the source country) 
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.  Authors own calculations. 
Turnover ratio 
 
Turnover ratio is total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization during the period.  
Source: Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook. 
Stocks traded Stocks traded is total value of shares traded during the period divided by GDP.  
Source: Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook. 
Market Capitalization Market capitalization is ratio of market capitalization of listed companies and GDP.  
Source: Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook. 
Double taxation treaty Dummy=1 if double taxation treaty exists between source and host country otherwise it is zero. 
Source: Price Waterhouse, 2001-2012 
Global financial crisis Dummy=1 during and after global financial crisis (2007 to 2011) otherwise it is zero (2001 to 
2006. Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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Table 1: Taxation Rates and Treatment of Dividends and Imputation (2011) 
Country Dividend Imputation Rate Corporate Income Tax Rate Personal Income Tax Rate  Effective  Tax Rate  
 Australia 30 30 46.5 46.5 
Austria 0 25 25 43.8 
Belgium 0 34 15 43.9 
Canada 26.4 27.6 46.4 48 
Denmark 0 25 42 56.5 
Finland 0 26 28 40.5 
France 0 34.4 52 57.8 
Germany 0 30.2 26.4 48.6 
Greece 0 20 21 32.5 
Hong Kong 0 16.5 15 31.5 
Ireland 0 12.5 41 48.4 
Italy 0 27.5 12.5 36.6 
Japan 0 39.5 10 45.6 
Netherlands 0 25 25 43.8 
Norway 0 28 28 48.2 
New Zealand 28 28 33 33 
Portugal 0 26.5 21.5 42.3 
Singapore 0 17 20 37 
Spain 0 30 19 43.3 
Sweden 0 26.3 30 48.4 
Switzerland 0 21.2 20 36.9 
UK 10 26 42.5 52.7 
US 0 39.2 21.2 52.1 
Note: Data are for 2011 and may differ for other years. Dividend imputation rate is the rate of corporate income tax imputed to shareholders. Corporate income tax rate is combined 
(central and sub-central) marginal statutory corporate income tax rate on distributed profits, inclusive of surtax (if any). Personal income tax rate is combined (central and sub-central) 
top marginal statutory personal income tax rate inclusive of surtax (if any), imposed on dividend income (on grossed-up dividends where gross-up provisions apply), before taking 
account of imputation systems, tax credits and tax allowances in source country. Effective tax rate is the effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit. 
Source: Tax information is from OECD tax database. Authors own calculations. 
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Table 2: Dividend tax withheld rates on dividend payment to foreigners (2011) 
Taxing        Investor aus aust bel can den fin fra ger gre hk ire ita jap net nor nz por sin spa swe swi uk us 
Country Home                        
aus  X 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 30 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 15 15 15 15 15 30 
aust  15 X 15 15 15 10 15 15 15 10 10 15 20 15 15 15 15 10 15 10 15 15 15 
bel  15 15 X 15 15 15 15 25 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 15 
can  15 15 15 X 15 15 15 15 15 25 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
den  15 15 15 15 X 15 28 15 18 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 28 15 15 25 15 
fin  15 10 15 15 15 X 0 15 13 28 5 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 10 28 15 
fra  15 15 15 15 25 15 X 15 25 25 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 25 15 15 
ger  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 X 25 25 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
gre  25 15 15 15 38 47 25 25 X 25 15 15 25 35 40 25 15 25 10 25 35 25 25 
hk  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ire  0 0 20 15 0 0 20 20 15 0 X 15 20 15 15 0 15 0 0 0 0 15 15 
ita  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 27 15 X 15 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 15 
jap  10 20 15 15 15 15 10 15 20 20 15 15 X 15 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 10 10 
net  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 X 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 
nor  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 25 15 15 15 15 X 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
nz  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 15 15 15 15 15 15 X 30 15 15 15 15 15 15 
por  21.5 15 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 21.5 10 15 21.5 X 10 15 10 15 15 15 
sin  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 
spa  15 10 15 15 19 10 15 10 5 19 15 15 10 15 10 15 10 19 X 10 15 10 10 
swe  15 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 30 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 X 15 5 15 
swi  15 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 15 35 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 X 15 15 
uk  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 
us  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 0 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 0 15 15 15 15 X 
Note: The dividend tax withheld rates are the highest corporate withheld taxes in foreign country on dividends generated in foreign country’s firms from home country’s investment for the year 
2011. X indicates that investors and taxing country are same. Bold numbers indicate double taxation treaty exists between investor country and taxing country. 
aus-Australia, aust-Austria, bel-Belgium, can-Canada, den-Denmark, fin-Finland, fra-France, ger-Germany, gre-Greece, hk-Hong Kong, ire-Ireland, ita-Italy, jap-Japan, net-Netherland, nor-
Norway, nz-New Zealand, por-Portugal, sin-Singapore, swe-Sweden, swi-Switzerland, uk-United Kingdom, us-United States. 
Source: Price Water House Coopers, 2001-2012. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Equity Flows 4002 -5.800 2.068 -15.229 -0.227 
Dividend tax credit1 4251 0.379 0.299 0 2.852 
Dividend tax credit2 4251 0.340 0.293 0 2.852 
Dividend tax rate 
Effective tax source 
Trade 
Size 
Foreign listing 
Turnover ratio 
Stocks traded 
Market capitalization  
4265 
4496 
4264 
4455 
4116 
4485 
4485 
4485 
13.352 
44.904 
-32.908 
26.998 
0.077 
1.023 
1.063 
0.932 
7.286 
7.967 
1.401 
1.428 
0.277 
0.553 
1.140 
0.655 
0 
25 
-37 
23.815 
0 
0.206 
0.028 
0.179 
47 
66.9 
-27.9 
30.758 
6.358 
4.040 
7.415 
2.828 
Note: Equity flows is log value of ratio of equity investment from source country to host country and financial wealth of source country. Dividend tax credit1 is product of foreign dividend tax 
withheld rate and dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is less than or equal to home country’s combined corporate income tax rate. It is product of home country’s combined 
corporate income tax rate and foreign dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is greater than home country’s combined corporate income tax. Dividend tax credit2 = Dividend tax 
credit1 if there is a double taxation treaty between home and foreign country, and Dividend tax credit2 = 0 otherwise. Dividend tax rate is dividend tax rate withheld in host country on source 
country investor’s dividend generated in host country. Effective tax source is effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit in source country. Trade is log value of ratio of 
imports of source country to product of gross domestic products (GDPs) of source and host countries. Size is log value of financial wealth of host country. Foreign listing is share of host 
country’s stock market that is listed on source country’s stock exchanges (either directly or has issued public debt in the source country). Turnover ratio is total value of shares traded during the 
period divided by the average market capitalization during the period. Stocks traded is total value of shares traded during the period divided by GDP. Market capitalization is ratio of market 
capitalization of listed companies and GDP.  
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Table 4: Correlation 
 EF DTC1 DTC2 DT ETS TR SZ FL TURN MC ST 
EF 1           
DTC1 -0.174 1          
DTC2 -0.048 0.889 1         
DT -0.158 0.566 0.426 1        
ETS 0.176 -0.039 0.078 -0.146 1       
TR 0.189 -0.063 -0.022 -0.055 -0.074 1      
SZ 0.637 -0.222 -0.184 -0.081 -0.083 -0.184 1     
FL 0.100 0.095 0.116 0.045 0.108 0.105 -0.155 1    
TURN 0.445 -0.096 -0.073 -0.035 -0.068 -0.093 0.459 -0.124 1   
MC 0.124 -0.377 -0.343 -0.410 0.013 -0.031 0.337 -0.161 0.082 1  
ST 0.289 -0.345 -0.309 -0.325 -0.020 -0.086 0.396 -0.145 0.559 0.677 1 
Note: Equity flows (EF) is log value of ratio of equity investment from source country to host country and financial wealth of source country. Dividend tax credit1 (DTC1) is product of foreign 
dividend tax withheld rate and dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is less than or equal to home country’s combined corporate income tax rate. It is product of home country’s 
combined corporate income tax rate and foreign dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is greater than home country’s combined corporate income tax. Dividend tax credit2 (DTC2) 
= Dividend tax credit1 if there is a double taxation treaty between home and foreign country, and Dividend tax credit2 = 0 otherwise. Dividend tax rate (DT) is dividend tax rate withheld in host 
country on source country investor’s dividend generated in host country. Effective tax source (ETS) is effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit in source country. Average 
tax burden (ATB) is log value of the weighted average tax burden on dividends earned from equities in host country where weights are the financial wealth of source country. Trade (TR) is log 
value of ratio of imports of source country to product of gross domestic products (GDPs) of source and host countries. Size (SZ) is log value of financial wealth of host country. Foreign listing 
(FL) is share of host country’s stock market that is listed on source country’s stock exchanges (either directly or has issued public debt in the source country). Turnover ratio (TURN) is total 
value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization during the period. Market capitalization (MC) is ratio of market capitalization of listed companies and GDP.  
Stocks traded (ST) is total value of shares traded during the period divided by GDP. 
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Table 5: Equity Flows, Dividend Tax Credit, Dividend Tax, Effective Tax  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lag Equity Flows 0.717*** 0.714*** 0.707*** 0.772*** 0.682*** 0.683*** 0.675*** 0.689*** 0.696*** 0.695*** 0.689*** 0.684*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend tax credit1 
 
0.283*** 
(0.000) 
0.336*** 
(0.000) 
0.307*** 
(0.000) 
0.330*** 
(0.000) 
        
Dividend tax credit2 
 
    0.279*** 
(0.000) 
0.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.301*** 
(0.000) 
0.286*** 
(0.000) 
    
Dividend tax         -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 
         (0.881) (0.976) (0.977) (0.778) 
Effective  tax source 0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.031) 
0.016** 
(0.020) 
0.016** 
(0.017) 
0.014** 
(0.035) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.008*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
Trade 
 
Size 
0.123*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.234*** 
0.119*** 
(0.000) 
0.254*** 
0.103*** 
(0.002) 
0.186*** 
0.125*** 
(0.000) 
0.275*** 
0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.245*** 
0.118*** 
(0.000) 
0.259*** 
0.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.254*** 
0.111*** 
(0.001) 
0.209*** 
0.109*** 
(0.002) 
0.200*** 
0.101*** 
(0.003) 
0.203*** 
0.122*** 
(0.002) 
0.242*** 
 
Foreign listing 
(0.000) 
0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.188*** 
(0.000) 
0.200*** 
(0.001) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.204*** 
(0.000) 
0.209*** 
(0.000) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.205*** 
(0.000) 
0.212*** 
(0.000) 
0.227*** 
(0.000) 
0.204*** 
 
Stocks traded 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
0.089*** 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.067*** 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.026* 
(0.000) (0.001) 
 
Turnover ratio 
 (0.000)  
0.132*** 
  (0.000)  
0.114*** 
  (0.075)  
0.088*** 
 
 
Market capitalization 
  (0.000)  
0.116* 
(0.059) 
 
 
 (0.000)  
0.032 
(0.553) 
  
 
(0.000)  
-0.059 
(0.352) 
Observation 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 
Wald Chi2 1644.96*** 
(0.000) 
1572.43*** 
(0.000) 
1690.29*** 
(0.000) 
2227.71*** 
(0.000) 
1399.17*** 
(0.000) 
1379.54*** 
(0.000) 
1437.53*** 
(0.000) 
1424.92*** 
(0.000) 
996.56*** 
(0.000) 
991.80*** 
(0.000) 
1029.76*** 
(0.000) 
1014.33*** 
(0.000) 
Arellano Bond Test m1 
 
Arellano Bond Test m2 
 
-6.539*** 
(0.000) 
0.200 
(0.841) 
-6.508*** 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.913) 
-6.548*** 
(0.000) 
0.162 
(0.870) 
-6.938*** 
(0.000) 
0.238 
(0.811) 
-6.539*** 
(0.000) 
0.213 
(0.830) 
-6.533*** 
(0.000) 
0.143 
(0.885) 
-6.549*** 
(0.000) 
0.176 
(0.859) 
-7.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.213 
(0.830) 
-6.774*** 
(0.000) 
0.391 
(0.695) 
-6.764*** 
(0.000) 
0.321 
(0.748) 
-6.814*** 
(0.000) 
0.266 
(0.790) 
-7.404*** 
(0.000) 
0.456 
(0.648) 
Note: Equity flows is dependent variable. Arellano-Bover/Blundell Bond Estimation with lags(1) and AR(2) tests. Arellano Bond test for no auto correlation. Lag Equity Flow is lag value of the 
dependent variable is not reported. P-values in brackets. Equity flows is log value of ratio of equity investment from source country to host country and financial wealth of source country. 
Dividend tax credit1 is product of foreign dividend tax withheld rate and dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is less than or equal to home country’s combined corporate income 
tax rate. It is product of home country’s combined corporate income tax rate and foreign dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is greater than home country’s combined corporate 
income tax. Dividend tax credit2 = Dividend tax credit1 if there is a double taxation treaty between home and foreign country, and Dividend tax credit2 = 0 otherwise. Dividend tax is dividend 
tax rate withheld in host country on source country investor’s dividend generated in host country. Effective tax source is effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit in source 
country. Refer Appendix Table A.1 for definition of Trade, Size, Foreign listing, Stocks traded, Turnover ratio, Market capitalization and Global financial crisis. 
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Table 6: Robustness Tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lag Equity Flows 0.608*** 0.600*** 0.604*** 0.620*** 0.645*** 0.644*** 0.648*** 0.651*** 0.614*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 0.626*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend tax credit1 
 
0.249*** 
(0.000) 
0.286*** 
(0.000) 
0.256*** 
(0.000) 
0.287*** 
(0.000) 
0.281*** 
(0.000) 
0.333*** 
(0.000) 
0.303*** 
(0.000) 
0.300*** 
(0.000) 
0.254*** 
(0.000) 
0.284*** 
(0.000) 
0.261*** 
(0.000) 
0.283*** 
(0.000) 
Effective tax source 0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
High tax 
 
Trade 
 
Size 
 
Foreign listing 
 
Stocks traded 
 
 
0.099*** 
(0.001) 
0.311*** 
(0.000) 
0.276*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.109*** 
(0.000) 
0.287*** 
(0.000) 
0.284*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
 
 
0.102*** 
(0.001) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.282*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
0.079** 
(0.014) 
0.249*** 
(0.000) 
0.277*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
0.063* 
(0.050) 
0.302*** 
(0.000) 
0.295*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.063* 
(0.051) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
0.309*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
 
 
0.053* 
(0.095) 
0.282*** 
(0.000) 
0.308*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
0.059* 
(0.071) 
0.261*** 
(0.000) 
0.294*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.531*** 
(0.008) 
0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.306*** 
(0.000) 
0.280*** 
(0.000) 
-0.508*** 
(0.011) 
0.125*** 
(0.000) 
0.286*** 
(0.000) 
0.288*** 
(0.000) 
0.054*** 
-0.534*** 
(0.008) 
0.119*** 
(0.000) 
0.295*** 
(0.000) 
0.287*** 
(0.000) 
-0.500*** 
(0.000) 
0.101*** 
(0.002) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
0.282*** 
(0.000) 
 
Turnover ratio 
 (0.000)  
0.073*** 
 
 
 (0.000)  
0.100*** 
  (0.000) 
 
 
0.066*** 
 
 
Market capitalization 
  (0.001)  
0.112** 
  (0.000)  
0.076 
 
 
 (0.005) 
 
 
0.088* 
 
Double taxation treaty 
 
0.591** 
 
0.664** 
 
0.634** 
(0.020) 
0.662** 
   (0.121)    (0.079) 
 
 (0.041) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023)         
Global financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.067*** 
(0.003) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055** 
(0.010) 
    
Observation 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 2937 
Wald Chi2 1518.66*** 
(0.000) 
1496.32*** 
(0.000) 
1559.13*** 
(0.000) 
1498.84*** 
(0.000) 
1441.83*** 
(0.000) 
1424.51*** 
(0.000) 
1452.53*** 
(0.000) 
1456.68*** 
(0.000) 
1195.90*** 
(0.000) 
1181.19*** 
(0.000) 
1216.33*** 
(0.000) 
1205.11*** 
(0.000) 
Arellano Bond Test m1 
 
Arellano Bond Test m2 
 
-8.196*** 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0.902) 
-8.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.117 
(0.906) 
-8.215*** 
(0.000) 
0.191 
(0.848) 
-8.451*** 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.987) 
-8.430*** 
(0.000) 
0.205 
(0.837) 
-8.420*** 
(0.000) 
0.234 
(0.814) 
-8.444*** 
(0.000) 
0.348 
(0.727) 
-8.611*** 
(0.000) 
0.095 
(0.923) 
-8.149*** 
(0.000) 
0.237 
(0.812) 
-8.127*** 
(0.000) 
0.221 
(0.825) 
-8.164*** 
(0.000) 
0.293 
(0.768) 
-8.537*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.933) 
Note: Equity flows is dependent variable. Arellano-Bover/Blundell Bond Estimation with lags(1) and AR(2) tests. Arellano Bond test for no auto correlation. Lag Equity Flow is lag value of the 
dependent variable is not reported. P-values in brackets. Equity flows is log value of ratio of equity investment from source country to host country and financial wealth of source country. 
Dividend tax credit1 is product of foreign dividend tax withheld rate and dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is less than or equal to home country’s combined corporate income 
tax rate. It is product of home country’s combined corporate income tax rate and foreign dividend yield if foreign dividend tax withheld rate is greater than home country’s combined corporate 
income tax. Effective tax source is effective (corporate plus personal) tax rate on distributed profit in source country. Refer Appendix Table A.1 for definition of High Tax, Trade, Size, Foreign 
listing, Stocks traded, Turnover ratio, Market capitalization, Double taxation treaty and Global financial crisis. 
